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DIRECTOR CONFLICTS OF INTEREST UNDER THE
MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT: A MODEL FOR
ALL STATES?
Peter E. Kay
Abstract: The American Bar Association has adopted a new model director conflict of
interest statute based on bright-line definitions and a rigid preclusion of judicial review. This
Comment examines the statute and provides revisions that are necessary for the statute to
operate as the drafters intended. The Comment also challenges the merits of the statute by
arguing that its reliance on disinterested director approval procedures is an inadequate
safeguard for shareholders and its emphasis on large corporations renders the statute
unsuitable for the majority of corporations.

In 1988, the American Bar Association adopted a new director
conflict of interest statute in an effort to eliminate uncertainty in the
conflict of interest field. The drafters felt that businesses could not
operate effectively under the constant threat of court scrutiny that was
present under previous Model Business Corporation Act provisions. The
resulting statute, subchapter F, sections 8.60 to 8.63, emphasizes the use
of disinterested director approval to prevent director conflicts of interest
from arising. It is questionable, however, whether the statute is suitable
for the majority of corporations, and its attempts to reduce court scrutiny
ironically may result in an increase in litigation.
This Comment focuses on the desirability of the statute's bright-line
standard, and on the degree to which the statute accomplishes its stated
goals of predictability and practical administration. Part I gives a brief
overview of the history of director conflict of interest law. Part II
provides a description of the statute. First, it analyzes the statute's
requirements for a "transaction," without which a director conflict of
interest cannot occur. Second, part II examines the elements necessary to
place a transaction within the statute's judicial review preclusion
framework.
Third, it considers the provision's judicial review
preclusion. Fourth, part II analyzes the provisions for insulating
transactions from judicial review through director and shareholder
approval. Part I examines the degree to which the statute accomplishes
its stated goals and discusses possible revisions. Finally, part IV
considers the implications and effects of adopting this statute, arguing
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that the statute's reliance on disinterested director approval is misguided
and that the provisions are ill-suited for most corporations.
I.

DIRECTOR CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAW FROM PAST TO
PRESENT

Corporate director conflicts of interest arise when directors' personal
or financial interests conflict with their fiduciary responsibilities to the
corporation and its shareholders. To raise the issue of a conflict of
interest, shareholders must bring derivative actions in the name of the
corporation against the interested directors.2 These shareholders seek a
recovery on behalf of the corporation for the alleged harm caused by the
interested directors' breach of fiduciary duty.3 The law governing these
corporate director conflicts of interest has developed over this century
from a common law approach into a statutory approach. The drafters of
the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) adopted a bright-line
statute approach that was intended to overcome some of the uncertainties
that existed under prior common and statutory conflict of interest law.
A.

Conflicts ofInterest at Common Law and the Development of
Statutes

At common law, the courts subjected director and officer conflict of
interest law to constant reinterpretation. Under the earliest analysis,
conflict of interest transactions between a corporate officer or director
and the corporation were voidable at the corporation's option.4
Gradually, courts departed from this original rule and began to accept
conflict of interest transactions that had rezeived disinterested
shareholder or director approval, provided that the director could prove
that such transactions were substantively fair to the corporation. 5 This
1. Black's Law Dictionary299 (6th ed. 1990). The most common director conflicts of interest are
(1) direct or indirect ownership of property leased to the corporation, (2) sales to or purchases from
organizations in which the director has an interest, and (3) ownership of a portion of the minority
equity in a subsidiary. William Nolan, Today's Director,20 N.Y.L.F. 313, 337 (1974).
2. Harry Henn and John Alexander, Laws of Corporations1037 (3d ed. 1983).
3. Id.
4. Harold Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflicts of Interest and CorporateMorality, 22 Bus.
Law. 35,36 (1966); see Wardell v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 103 U.S. 651, 656 (1881).
5. Marsh, supra note 4, at 40; Holcomb v. Forsythe, 113 So. 516, 520 (Ala. 1927). Substantive
fairness is determined by evaluating the terms of the transaction. Some courts have held that fairness
is determined by whether or not the transaction resembles the results of normal arm's length business
negotiations. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939).
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doctrinal shift originally occurred in cases of interlocking directorships,
in which two corporations had common directors.6 The reasons for this
shift have not yet been satisfactorily explained.7
Permitting the approval of conflict of interest transactions by
disinterested directors or shareholders, however, created great
uncertainty as new issues arose. These issues included whether or not
the interested director could be counted for purposes of a quorum at the
board meeting, the criteria necessary for being a disinterested director or
shareholder, and who held the burden of proof on transaction fairness.8
As the common law doctrine evolved, states began to enact statutes
specifically addressing officer and director conflict of interest
transactions, with California enacting the first such law in 193. 9 This
California statute served as a basis for the MBCA section 41, adopted by
the ABA in 1969.10 Although approximately 35 states adopted these
statutory provisions," the lack of term definitions caused confusion as to
what exactly constituted a conflict of interest. 2
Furthermore, the courts were uncertain of the requirements necessary
to preclude judicial review of transactions under these statutes. In3
California, the court in Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-DandiniCo.1
rejected the interpretation that an interested director's compliance with
the state's conflict of interest approval procedures precluded judicial
review of transaction fairness. The court held that, even though the
approval of a transaction technically met the statute's requirements, a
6. Ahmed Bulbulia & Arthur R. Pinto, Statutory Responses to InterestedDirectors' Transactions:
A WateringDown of FiduciaryStandards?,53 Notre Dame L. Rev. 201,203 (1977).
7. Marsh, supranote 4, at 40-41.
8. Lizabeth A. Moody, Statutory Solutions to Conflicts ofInterest in Close Corporations,35 Clev.
St. L. Rev. 95, 100 (1987).
9. Cal. Civ. Code § 311 (1931) amended and retitledCal. Corp. Code § 820 (1947).
10. Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 41 (2d ed. 1971). The section declares that transactions
between a corporation and a director or entity in which a director is financially interested are not
voidable if (1) after disclosure, the board approves the transaction without the interested director's
vote; (2) after disclosure, shareholders entitled to vote approve the transaction; or (3) the transaction
is fair and reasonable to the corporation. Id. Compliance with the statute's procedural provisions,
however, does not entirely validate a transaction, but simply establishes that it was not automatically
void or voidable by reason of the director's interest.
11. See American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and
Recommendations 312 (Proposed Final Draft 1992) for a listing of states that have adopted MBCA
§ 41 and other statutes [hereinafter ALI].
12. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation
Act-Amendments Pertainingto Directors' Conflicting Interest Transactions,44 Bus. Law. 1307,
1308 (1989) [hereinafter Committee Report].
13. 241 P.2d 66 (Cal. App. 1952).
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corporation may still void transactions containing unfair and
unreasonable terms. 14 The court thus interpreted the statute to require
both procedural and substantive fairness. These conflict of interest
statutes, therefore, did not resolve all the ambiguities present in the field
of conflict of interest law.
B.

The Drafters' Objectives in MBCA Sections 8.60-8.63

The confusion over the scope of statutory coverage prompted the
drafters of the MBCA, the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, to take a
fresh look at director conflict of interest law.15 The committee argued
that businesses cannot function effectively in an environment where
16
courts can review possible conflict of interest transactions years later.
The twin objectives of this statutory revision effort were, therefore, to
increase predictability and to enhance the practical administration of
director conflict of interest transactions.17 To accomplish these twin
objectives, the drafters proposed a precise director conflict of interest
definition. In addition, the drafters created a more exacting set of safe
harbor procedures than those found in prior statutes, in order to better
insulate director conflict of interest transactions from court review. 8 The
resulting statute, however, specifically excludes non-director officer and
employee conflicts of interest from its coverage. Instead, the drafters
state that the law of agency prescribing loyalty of an agent to a principal,
as well as internal rules and personnel procedures of a corporation, can
adequately govern such situations. 9
A conflict of interest transaction, however, must be within the bright
lines established by the statute in order to qualify for safe harbor
protection. The drafters recognized that, as with any bright-line,
situations falling just outside the lines would bear a close resemblance to
those covered by the statute. Nonetheless, because of the need for
predictability in the conflict of interest field, the drafters accepted such
tradeoffs.2"
The committee also argued that conflict of interest

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 74.
Committee Report, supra note 12, at 1308.
Id. at 1309.
Id. at 1308.
Id.

19. Id. at 1310.
20. Id. at 1309.
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transactions are not crimes, torts, or necessarily injurious to others.2 '
Courts should, therefore, accord strong countervailing weight under
conflict of interest law to "social" values, such as economic efficiency,
predictability, and business finality.' Furthermore, as the courts can still
attack events that fall outside a statutory definition on other legal
grounds,' a bright-line approach appeared to best accomplish the desired
objectives.
After more than three and a half years of work, the ABA adopted
these director conflict of interest provisions as subchapter F of the
MBCA in December 1988.24 These provisions, however, have not
received widespread acceptance. As of July 1, 1993, only four states,
Georgia,' Mississippi,26 Montana,27 and Washington, 8 had adopted the
statute.
II.

OVERVIEW OF SUBCHAPTER F: MBCA §§ 8.60-8.63

The statute consists of four sections: 1) Definitions, 2) Preclusion of
judicial review, 3) Director transaction approval provisions, and 4)
Shareholder approval provisions. For these provisions to apply, the
statute requires the presence of a transaction that meets the drafters'
criteria. Once the presence of a transaction is established, the statute
places possible conflict of interest transactions into one of two
categories, depending on the director's relationship to the transaction.
Under section 8.60(1)(i), the first category, a director possesses a
conflicting interest in a transaction if the director knows at the time of
21. Id. Commentators have challenged this conclusion by arguing that unfaithflulness is a serious
moral failure by individuals charged with responsibility for the affairs of others. See Douglas
Branson, Assault on Another Citadel: Attempts to Curtail the Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty
Applicable to Corporate Directors, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 375, 388 (1988).
22. Committee Report, supra note 12, at 1309. These values, however, are all economic in nature,
not social.
23. Id. at 1308; see Klinicki v. Lundgren, 695 P.2d 906 (Or. 1985) (seizing a corporate
opportunity); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E. 2d 505 (Mass. 1975) (breaching a
fiduciary duty to minority shareholders).
24. Committee Report, supra note 12, at 1307.
25. Ga. Code Ann. §§ 14-2-860 to -863 (Michie 1990). Georgia has also extend the statutory
coverage to include corporate officers. Id. § 14-2-864.
26. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 379-4-860 to -863 (Supp. 1992).
27. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 35-1-461 to -464 (1991).
28. Wash. Rev. Code. §§ 23B.08.700-.730 (1993). The Washington Legislature also adopted the
commentary to subchapter F as official state legislative history. 1989 Wash. Senate Journal 3057-73.
29. Model Business Corp. Act Ann. §§ 8.60-8.63 (Supp. 1992), reprinted in Committee Report,
supra note 12, at 1313-31.
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commitment" that the director or a "related person" is 1) a party to the
transaction, or 2) has such a significant "beneficial financial interest" in
or so closely linked to the transaction that it would influence the director
in an approval vote.3'
In the second category, section 8.60(1)(ii), a conflict of interest exists
if, in a transaction of such significance that it is o:r would normally be
brought before the board, the director knows at the time of commitment
that certain entities with which the director has a significant relationship
are either 1) parties, or 2) have such a significant "beneficial financial
interest" in or so closely linked to the transaction that it would influence
the director in an approval vote.32
The preclusion of judicial review, section 8.61, declares that courts
may not review, on grounds of a director conflict of interest, transactions
that do not meet the statutory definitions.33 This section also denies
courts the power to attack, enjoin, or award damages for transactions that
meet the statutory definitions if either 1) disinterested directors approved
the transaction, 2) shareholders approved the transaction, or 3) the
transaction is fair to the corporation when the transaction is entered
into.34 To preclude judicial review of transactions, the director approval
section requires an affirmative vote by a majority of the corporation's
"qualified directors," after the interested director has provided the
required disclosure.35 For shareholder approval to be effective in
precluding court review, an affirmative vote by a majority of the
corporation's "qualified shares" is necessary, once the required
disclosure has occurred.
A.

The Requirementsfor a Transaction

Under subchapter F, an event must possess two elements before it is
considered to be a "transaction" in which a conflict of interest may
occur. First, the provisions require that the corporation actually take
action or be a party to the event, either directly or through a controlled

30. Id. § 8.60(5). Time of commitment means the time when a transaction is consummated or
when unilateral withdrawal would entail significant loss. Id.
31. Id. § 8.60(l)(i).
32. Id. § 8.60(l)(ii).
33. Id. § 8.61(a).
34. Id. § 8.61(b). The interested director has the burden of proof in determining the transaction's
fairness. See Committee Report, supranote 12, at 1324.
35. Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 8.62.
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entity.36 If a corporation refrains from acting, a shareholder may not
challenge, on conflict of interest grounds, any benefits that accrue to a
director from the event, because a transaction is not present under
subchapter F.37 The statute also does not consider unilateral actions by a
director, such as seizing a corporate opportunity or entering into
competition with the corporation, to be transactions. These events are
excluded from coverage because any possible bilateral exchanges present
do not involve the corporation as a party.3" Shareholders, however, may
still attack these director actions under common law theories based upon
the director's duty of loyalty.39
Second, the comments declare that the term "transaction" connotes a
negotiation or consensual bilateral arrangement between the corporation
and another party that concerns the economic rights and interests of the
respective parties.40 A transaction under subchapter F is, therefore, a
"deal" and not simply a unilateral action conducted by the corporation or
the director.4" For example, if the directors commit the corporation to a
"crown jewel" option42 with a third party, a transaction exists under the
statute.43 Such action involves a negotiated deal with other parties
concerning their respective economic rights and interests. On the other
hand, the drafters do not consider a decision to distribute "poison pill"
rights" to be a transaction.4" In these situations, only unilateral action by
the corporation is present and, therefore, no transaction is present.

36. Committee Report, supranote 12, at 1317-18.

37. Id. at 1317.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1308; see, e.g., Klinicki v. Lundgren, 695 P.2d 906 (Or. 1985) (holding that a director
who seizes a corporate opportunity is in violation of the duty of loyalty); Lincoln Stores, Inc. v.
Grant, 34 N.E.2d. 704 (Mass. 1941) (finding that a director's entrance into competition with the
corporation is a violation of the duty of loyalty).
40. Committee Report, supra note 12, at 1310.
41. Id.
42. A crown jewel is the granting of purchase options on desirable assets to a friendly party in an
attempt to discourage hostile takeovers. Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261,
1286 n.37 (Del. 1989).
43. Committee Report, supranote 12, at 1317.
44. Poison pill rights provide shareholders with the right to be bought out by the corporation at a
substantial premium upon the occurrence of a stated triggering event. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986).
45. Committee Report, supranote 12, at 1317.

Washington Law Review
B.

Vol169:207, 1994

Conflicting Interest Transactions

Even if an event is within the statute's restrictive transaction
definition, it still may not be challenged by shareholders under conflict
of interest rules if the transaction fails to present a conflict of interest
under either section 8.60(1)(i) or (1)(ii). These sections establish the two
subchapter F conflict of interest categories that include common required
elements as well as ones specific to each category.
1.

Section 8.60(1)( Transactions:DirectorsandRelated Persons

The entities covered under this first category, section 8.60(l)(i),
consist of the director and persons related to the director.4 6 The related
person term encompasses two specific and exclusive subclasses. The first
subclass encompasses family members and their spouses,47 individuals
in the director's household, and trusts and estates of which these
individuals are significant beneficiaries.48 The second subclass consists
of trusts, estates, incompetents, and minors of which the director is a
fiduciary.49

46. Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 8.60(l)(i).
47. Id. § 8.60(3). A related person of the director includes "the spouse (or a parent or sibling
thereof) of the director, or a child, grandchild, sibling, parent (or spouse of any thereof) of the
director." Id. This definition of a related person has also been adopted by the ALI. See ALI, supra
note 11, § 1.03(a).
48. Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 8.60(3)(i).
49. Id. § 8.60(3)(ii). The statute already covers some of these situations under the first subclass.
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The exclusive set of family members covered by the statute is best
illustrated by a diagram:
Grandparents*

Grandparents*

I

F

I

I

II
Cousins*

FI

Parents

Parents

Aunts/Uncles*

Spouses-Siblings

I

Director-Spouse

Children*

I

I
Siblings-Spouses*

Children-Spouses

I

Children*

Grandchildren-Spouses
* These individuals are not considered related persons and, therefore, transactions with

them are not considered conflicts of interest under subchapter F.

In addition to these family members, the term related persons also
includes non-family individuals sharing the same home as the director. °
Because the statute's use of the term spouse is intended to include
common law spouses and unrelated cohabitants,5 the "same home"
provision was presumably designed to include half- and step-relatives,
roommates, and live-in servants. Finally, trusts and estates of which
these relatives and individuals are significant beneficiaries are within the
scope of the statute. Directors are thereby prevented from indirectly
benefiting otherwise covered individuals through trusts established for
their benefit.
2.

Section 8.60(1)(ii) Transactions:Entities with Economic Ties to the
Director

Section 8.60(1)(ii), the second category of covered transactions,
requires the presence of two elements in order for a conflict of interest to
arise. First, it examines transactions involving specified entities with
which the director possesses certain ties. Second, the section includes
only those transactions that are significant enough to the corporation to
warrant a decision at the board level.

50. Id. § 8.60(3)(i).
51. Committee Report, supra note 12, at 1320.
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This section establishes three sets of covered entities that encompass
the professional and employment associates of a director. The first set
consists of those entities, other than the corporation, of which the
director is a general partner, employee, director or agent. 2 The second
set encompasses those individuals who control any entity in the first set
or entities controlled by or under common control of an entity in the first
set. This extension of statutory coverage to these economically linked
entities is consistent with the drafters' notion that the statute's
applicability should not depend on formalistic ownership distinctions. 3
The statute, however, is not intended to apply to transactions between a
parent corporation and a partially owned subsidiary. :4 Instead, the courts
must address these transactions under the developing common law of a
controlling shareholder's fiduciary duty." Finally, he third set includes
individuals who are general partners, principals, or employers of the
director.5 6
Section 8.60(1)(ii) also limits conflicts of interest to those transactions
significant enough to warrant attention by the acting corporation's board
of directors. For a conflict of interest to arise, the section requires that
the transaction either have been actually brought before the board, or be
of such character and significance that, in the normal course of business,
it would be brought before the board.57 There is no precise bright line,
however, that determines when board approval is required. Furthermore,
subehapter F does not provide any guidance in resol.ving this issue. The
modem rule states that a board must approve extraordinary corporate
actions, but not ordinary actions.58 The difficulty, however, lies in
determining what is ordinary and what is extraordinary; the issue is
highly dependent on the context in which it is raised.59
Section 8.60(l)(ii) contains this extra threshold requirement because
the drafters viewed the linkage between directors and business associates

52. Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 8.60(l)(ii)(A).
53. Committee Report, supranote 12, at 1318.
54. Id. at 1319.
55. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (self-dealing present when a
parent receives benefit from a subsidiary to the detriment of the subsidiary's minority shareholders).
56. Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 8.60(l)(ii)(C).
57. Id. § 8.60(1)(ii).
58. Lee v. Jenkins Bros., 268 F.2d 357 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 361 U.S. 913 (1959); see ALI, supra
note 11, § 3.02 (listing the fimctions of the board of directors).
59. ALI, supra note 11, § 3.02 commentary at 110. The ALI defines extraordinary actions as
situations that affect the control or the structure of the corporation. Id. at 111.
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60
to be more distant than the one between directors and related persons.
This viewpoint is consistent with the common law distinction that
developed between cases involving direct conflicts of interest, and those
involving interlocking directors. 6 The comments state that sufficient
reason does not exist to subject routine business dealings to court
challenge because the terms of these dealings are determined by
Furthermore, since most of these
competitive market forces.62
transactions are conducted at personnel levels far below the board,63 only
transactions that merit board approval are considered conflicts of interest
under subchapter F. Case law has demonstrated, however, that lower
level employees can be influenced by a director,' 4 and, therefore, such
transactions are not necessarily determined by market forces.

3.

Party to the Transaction andInterest in the TransactionElements

Directors possess a conflict of interest under subchapter F if a covered
entity6' either 1) is a party to the transaction, or 2) has a significant
beneficial financial interest in or so closely linked to the transaction that
this relationship would reasonably be expected to influence the director
in an approval vote. Under the party category of section 8.60(l)(i) and
(ii) transactions, the mere presence of a covered entity in a transaction is
sufficient to invoke statutory coverage. This coverage may encompass
situations in which a director or a related person is a nominal party in
transactions with the corporation. Examples include serving as a
registered agent or escrow agent.
A conflict of interest may also arise under subchapter F when a
covered entity possesses certain beneficial financial interests. The
beneficial financial interest, in the case of a director, must be separate
from any interest the director possesses as a result of being a director or
shareholder of the corporation.66 For example, a director's interest in a
transaction based on its possible impact on the corporation's stock price
or profits is not considered to give rise to a conflict of interest. On the
other hand, directors possessing sufficiently large ownership interests in
60. Committee Report, supranote 12, at 1318.
61. See supranotes 6-7 and accompanying text.
62. Committee Report, supranote 12, at 1318.
63. Id. at 1318-19.
64. See Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 121 N.E. 378 (N.Y. 1918).
65. This term refers to the respective entities under Model Business Corp. Act Ann.
§ 8.60(l)(i)-(ii). See supranotes 46-56 and accompanying text.
66. Committee Report, supranote 12, at 1315.
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entities that conduct business with the corporation or directors who are
significant creditors of the corporation are considered to have a
beneficial financial interest under the statute. 67
According to the drafters, this beneficial financial interest must not be
based on a contingent or remote gain.68 The "in or so closely linked"
element requires that the economic gain of the covered entity hinge
directly on the transaction.6 9 Future reductions in the director's local
taxes, or future increases in services owned by the director that are
unrelated to the corporation, are examples of interests too remote to
constitute a conflict of interest under the statute.7 ° On the other hand, an
example of a "so closely linked" interest would be a director owning land
near one of several possible corporate expansion sites. The director may
not have an interest in the land actually selected by the corporation, but
the director's property will greatly appreciate in value if the board selects
the particular location near the director's land.
Finally, the statute requires that the interest be of such financial
significance to the director or related person that it would reasonably be
expected to exert an influence on the director's voting decision.7' The
court, in reviewing a conflict of interest accusation, inquires as to
whether the covered entity's interest is of such financial significance that
an outside observer would reasonably expect it to influence the director's
judgment. This objective standard does not require the existence of an
actual influence upon the director, but only that one may be reasonably
expected.72
C.

Preclusionof JudicialReview

Under subchapter F, a transaction must comply precisely with the
statutory requirements in order for a conflict of interest to arise. If a
particular requirement is lacking, the preclusion of judicial review
provision prevents a court from setting aside or enjoining a transaction,
or awarding damages on the grounds of a director conflict of interest.73
The statute preempts the conflict of interest field and forbids courts from
67. Id. at 1316.
68. Id. at 1315.
69. Id.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 1315-17.
Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 8.60(1)(i)-(ii).
Committee Report, supranote 12, at 1315.
Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 8.61(a).
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finding such an interest present in situations that lie outside the statute's
bright lines.7 4 Subehapter F, however, does not prevent courts from
examining such transactions under other expanded notions of a director's
duty of loyalty.7'
In transactions that satisfy the conflict of interest requirements, neither
the interested director nor the transaction itself is vulnerable to legal
attack on conflict of interest grounds if either the disinterested director or
shareholder approval procedures have been complied with.76 Both the
interested director and the transaction are also immune from legal attack
if a court determines the transaction was fair to the corporation.7 7
D.

The DirectorApproval Safe HarborProvision

To establish safe harbor protection for director conflict of interest
transactions, most corporations will utilize the provisions authorizing an
approval vote by a majority of the corporation's qualified directors.78
This approval vote requires at least two qualified directors voting for
approval and may occur at any time either before or after the actual
transaction.79 Before the vote occurs, the interested director must make a
required disclosure to the other members of the board."0 The disclosure
should reveal the existence and nature of the conflicting interest, as well
as all facts known to the director that an ordinarily prudent person would
believe to be material."
To be considered a qualified director under the statute, individuals
must meet two criteria.82 First, the director may not have a conflicting
interest in the transaction. 3 This requirement excludes those directors
interested in the transaction as defined by section 8.60. Second, the

74. Committee Report, supra note 12, at 1322. For example, ifa conflict of interest is claimed as
a result of a transaction with a director's cousin, the court must declare that, since a cousin is not a
related party under § 8.60(3), a conflict of interest is not present. Id.
75. See Klinicki v. Lundgren, 695 P.2d 906 (Or. 1985) (seizing a corporate opportunity); Cole
Real Estate Corp. v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 310 N.E.2d 275 (Ind. App. 1977) (misuse of
corporate property).
76. Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 8.61(b)(l)-(2).

77. Id. § 8.61(b)(3).
78. Committee Report, supranote 12, at 1328.
79. Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 8.62.

80. Id. § 8.62(a).
81. Id. § 8.60(4).

82. Id. § 8.62(d).
83. Id.
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director may not have a familial, financial, professional, or employment
relationship with the interested director that would reasonably be
expected to exert an influence on the first director. 4 The comments
declare that the determination of whether or not such a relationship exists
should be based on each individual situation rather than on formalistic
rules." The drafters, however, do not provide any examples of what
relationships are considered sufficient. This section, with its more openended, case-by-case determination of a director's status, stands in sharp
contrast to the statutory bright-line approach utilized in other
provisions.86
E.

The ShareholderApproval Safe HarborProvisions

A conflict of interest transaction may also achieve safe harbor
protection through shareholder approval.
The statute requires a
majority vote of all qualified shares in order to protect a transaction from
court review.88 Before this vote occurs, notice must be provided to all
shareholders that describes the conflict of interest, the interested director
must inform the corporation's vote tabulator of all shares that the director
knows are not qualified, and the required disclosure 89 must be provided
to the voting shareholders."
Qualified shares consist of all corporate shares except those that the
secretary or other authorized vote tabulator knows are either owned by or
the voting rights are controlled by the director or a related party.91 This
definition disqualifies those shares that the vote tabulator knows of
independently, as well as those indicated by the interested director before
the approval vote occurs. Shares owned by entities that possess certain
economic ties with the director under section 8.60(l)(ii), however, are
considered qualified. The drafters state that no reason exists to strip
these entities of their voting rights because they will vote in accordance
with their own economic interests, rather than those of the interested
84. Id.
85. Committee Report, supranote 12, at 1330.
86. See, e.g., Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 8.60(3).
87. Id. § 8.63.
88. Id.
89. Id. § 8.60(4); see supranote 81 and accompanying text.
90. Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 8.63(a). The section, however, does not delineate who is
responsible for providing the notice to the shareholders or who bears the expense of a proxy
solicitation.
91. Id. § 8.63(b).
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director.92 Furthermore, it is doubtful whether a director will ever know
if these entities actually own shares of the corporation.93
I.

NECESSARY REVISIONS TO SUBCHAPTER F

Although subchapter F partially accomplishes the drafters' intended
goals, amendments are required for the statute to function effectively.
Five needed modifications concern extending statutory coverage to
officers, the requirements for a transaction, the related person definition,
the types of parties to a transaction, and the preclusion of judicial review
provisions. States that have adopted subehapter F, or are considering
such adoption, should enact these amendments to resolve some of the
ambiguities and inconsistencies that are present in the current statute.
A.

Extending SubchapterF Coverageto CorporateOfficers

The coverage of Subehapter F should be extended to include corporate
officers, as the drafters' rationale for excluding such individuals is
unconvincing. The drafters state that officer conflicts of interest are
covered by the general laws of agency and are, therefore, excluded from
subchapter F.94 Additionally, the drafters appear to maintain that,
because most large corporations have internal regulations governing
officer conduct,9 5 including officer conflicts within the statute would be
redundant. Both courts and conflict of interest statutes, however,
historically have addressed officer and director conflicts of interest under
the same doctrine.96 Furthermore, state corporate statutes must be
responsive to the needs of all corporations, not just large ones. These
smaller corporations may not have, nor be able to afford, the elaborate
internal personnel regulations found in larger companies.
States
adopting subchapter F should, therefore, amend the statute to include
coverage of officer conflicts, as Georgia has done.97

92. Committee Report, supranote 12, at 1332.
93. Id.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 1310.
Id.
See supranotes 4-9 and accompanying text.
Ga. Code Ann. § 14-2-864 (Michie 1990).
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The Restrictive TransactionRequirements of SubchapterF

Second, the exclusion of many events from conflict of interest review,
as a result of the restrictive transaction requirements of subchapter F, will
produce different legal outcomes in factual situations that previously
have been analyzed under the same legal doctrines. These differing
outcomes are difficult to reconcile under the statute's practical
administration objective. For example, courts previously analyzed
poison pill plans and crown jewel options98 under the same enhanced
business judgment rules.99 These two actions are merely different
defenses against hostile takeover attempts. Under te statute's restrictive
multiple party "deal" requirement, crown jewel options are characterized
as transactions and, therefore, eligible to receive safe harbor protection
from judicial scrutiny."°
Poison pills on the other hand, are not
considered to be transactions under subchapter F, and now lie outside the
scope of conflict of interest law. Instead, these excluded takeover
defenses are subjected to greater scrutiny under the developing law that
governs takeovers.
In creating this takeovr defense coverage
dichotomy, however, the drafters do not offer any sound policy reasons
for the distinctions they draw.
The multiple party "deal" requirement also excludes the vast category
of unilateral corporate actions that impact the economic rights of other
parties. Examples of these actions include forgiving a director's debt to
the corporation and guaranteeing a director's obligation to a third party.
A conflict of interest would appear to be present but, because these
actions do not involve a consensual bilateral arrangement between two
parties, they are not considered conflicts of interest under the statute.
States that enact subchapter F, therefore, should not adopt these
restrictive requirements and instead interpret the transaction element
broadly.

98. See supranotes 42-45 and accompanying text.
99. Compare Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)
(finding that decisions regarding poison pill plans are subject to the business judgment rule) with
Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988) (finding that decisions
regarding crown jewels are subject to the business judgment rule). See supra notes 42-45 and
accompanying text.
100. Committee Report, supra note 12, at 1317.
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C.

The Related PartyDefinition:Predictabilityover Fairness

A third necessary revision concerns the related person bright-line
definition set forth in section 8.60(3).
By overemphasizing
predictability, subchapter F creates unwarranted complexity and
arbitrariness in an area of conflict of interest law that courts are more
able to equitably judge. The related person definition should instead
provide for a more open-ended set of relationships and the consideration
of actual family circumstances.
Traditional American family relationships have undergone drastic
change in recent years through the increase in divorce, remarriage,
adoption, single parents, and same and opposite sex couples living
together." 1 The drafters of subchapter F have attempted to classify these
relationships within a bright-line statute. The resulting definition is a
complex and awkwardly worded attempt to encompass a vast yet
exclusive set of relationships. 2 Subchapter F also finds the mere
existence of a covered relationship sufficient to invoke its provisions.
Courts, however, have addressed conflicts of interest on a case-bycase basis, rather than by automatic presumptions.0 3 Courts also will not
hesitate to reach out and include more distantly related individuals when
the facts warrant action."° The ability to examine a wide range of
relationships on a case-by-case basis enables a court to make more
realistic determinations on specific facts. 0 5 For example, suppose a
corporation engages in a transaction with an estranged in-law of a
director. Although the director and the relative may not be on speaking
terms, subchapter F presumes a conflict of interest based on family status
alone. On the other hand, a director could have a close relationship with

101. See generally William R. Beer, Relative Strangers: Studies of Stepfamily Processes 14
(1988) (documenting the increased rates of single parents and remarriages); Barry D. Adams, The
Rise of the Gay and Lesbian Movement 121-60 (1987) (documenting the rise of the gay rights
movement); James M. Henslin ed., Marriage and Family in a Changing Society 76, 576 (3d ed.
1989) (documenting increased divorce rates and numbers of unmarried couples living together).
102. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
103. See e.g., Imberman v. Alexander, 184 N.Y.S.2d 801, 805 (N.Y. Supp. 1959) ("[t]he fatherson relationship does not of itself create a liability").
104. Knox Glass Bottle Co. v. Underwood, 89 So. 2d 799 (Miss. 1956) (conflict of interest
present in transactions with grandchildren's trusts), cert. denied,353 U.S. 977 (1957).
105. One court has already considered the effects of family friction on family relationship
statutory provisions in the context of tax attribution of share redemptions under 26 U.S.C.
§ 302(b)(1) (1988). Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 43 (Ist Cir. 1975); contra, Metzger Trust
v. Commissioner, 693 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1982) cert. denied,463 U.S. 1207 (1983).
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a cousin, but6 any possible conflict of interest is excluded by the statute's
1
definition.
Subehapter F already provides for an open-ended court inquiry on
relationship status in the context of qualified directors, through its use of
the term "familial relationship," rather than related person. 7 The statute
should, therefore, incorporate a similar open-ended determination of
covered relationships and consider the actual family circumstances
present. This would avoid the unwarranted complex ity and arbitrariness
currently present in such determinations.
D.

The Need to Exclude De Minimis Parties:Consistent with the
Statutory Objectives

The current statute is flawed in a fourth area, the scope of parties
covered. The inclusion of parties within statutory coverage that do not
possess a financial interest in the transaction runs contrary to the
drafters' notions of a conflict of interest. Instead, the party category
should include a financial de minimis requirement to screen out
transactions of negligible financial value and nominal party involvement.
The official commentary declares that, for a conflict of interest to exist,
there first must be a transaction in which the director has a financial
interest.! Furthermore, the drafters explain that limiting a conflict of
interest inquiry to the financial interests of the director, immediate family
members, and associates is the only practical course available in
regulating conflict of interest transactions under subchapter F.1 9 In
nominal party transactions, however, the entity does not possess a
financial interest in the transaction, yet is still within the statutory scope.
Because a financial de minimis requirement appears to be more
consistent with the drafters' intent, either legislatures should amend the
provisions or courts should interpret them to exclude nominal party
transactions.

106. If a shareholder charges that a conflict of interest occurred as a result of a transaction with a
director's cousin, the court must declare that since a cousin is not a related party under § 8.60(3), a
conflict of interest is not present. Committee Report, supranote 12, at 1322; see supranotes 46-51
and accompanying text.
107. Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 8.62(d); see supranotes 84-46 and accompanying text,
108. Committee Report, supranote 12, at 1316.
109. Id. at 1310.
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E.

DraftingInconsistencyin the PreclusionofJudicialReview

A fifth inconsistency in the statute concerns a drafting error in the
judicial preclusion section. This error raises questions about the statute's
effectiveness in protecting corporations that utilize the statute's safe
harbor provisions. Under sections 8.60(1)(i) and (ii), the definition of a
conflicting interest includes an "interest in or so closely linked to the
transaction."' .. The italicized language, however, does not appear in the
judicial preclusion provisions, as this section is limited to "interests in
the transaction."' The language difference may indicate that a category
of interests so closely linked to a transaction constitutes a conflict of
interest, but is not within the judicial preclusion provisions."' The
predictability objective of the statute, however, does not appear to
support such an interpretation. Although the "so closely linked"
language could already be incorporated in the defined conflict of interest
term under sections 8.60(1)(i) and (ii), it is probably a drafting error.
Although courts will likely interpret the term "interest" broadly to
include closely linked situations, they could also interpret the statute to
require substantive fairness for these closely linked interests, regardless
of the presence of director or shareholder approval." 3 As the safe harbor
provisions were intended to avoid such a judicial result, states that have
adopted subehapter F should amend their laws to close this loophole
antithetical to the statute's predictability objectives.
IV. FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN THE APPROACH OF
SUBCHAPTER F
Redrafing can eliminate the statutory problems concerning officer
coverage, transactions, related persons, de minimis parties, and the
preclusion of judicial review. Fundamental flaws concerning the
statute's over reliance on disinterested director approval and its
unsuitability for most corporations, however, raise serious doubts as to
whether subchapter F is indeed a model that states should adopt.

110. Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 8.60(1)(i)-(ii) (emphasis added).
111. Id. § 8.61(b).
112. John Steel, Directors' ConflictingInterest Transactions,in The 1990 Business Law Section
MidyearMeeting andSeminar, 6-1, 6-17 (Washington State Bar Ass'n ed., 1990).
113. See Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66 (Cal. App. 1952); see supra
notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
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Over Reliance on DisinterestedDirectorApproval

The statute's reliance on disinterested director approval, the safe
harbor provision more likely to be utilized by corporations, is
inappropriate for three reasons. First, its overemphasis on the use of
disinterested director approval can lead to less substantive scrutiny of
transactions. Second, subchapter F's complete reliance on director
approval procedures, without any substantive fainess safeguards, is
misguided in light of group dynamics research that questions whether
directors can ever be truly disinterested. Finally, the statute's proposed
protection against improper director action is seriously weakened by the
business judgment rule and inadequate when compared with the
protections contained in other state statutes.
1.

Overemphasis on DirectorApproval Results in Less Scrutiny of
Transactions

Subchapter F's overemphasis on the precautionary use of director
approval will lead to inadequate transaction scrutiny, as unnecessary
approval votes will clutter already crowded corporate board agendas.
Although the statute emphasizes bright lines, the extent of coverage is
unclear in some sections, particularly the benefic:ial financial interest
provisions. The official comments acknowledge the vague scope of this
section and recommend that individuals subject any questionable
transaction to the statutory safe harbor provisions."" The drafters claim
that corporations will suffer only nuisance harm if a court ultimately
determines that a conflict of interest was not present." 5 For most
transactions, disinterested director approval will be utilized to secure safe
harbor protection.
These precautionary director approval votes, however, will cause
significantly greater harm to shareholders' interests. The routine use of
precautionary approval votes will lull directors into a false sense of
security and inhibit the adequate scrutiny of actual conflict of interest
transactions. Because of this constant need to approve possible conflict
of interest transactions, director approval will become little more than a

114. Committee Report, supra note 12, at 1323.
115. Id.
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rubber stamp1 6 that does not adequately protect the interests of
shareholders
The overemphasis on approval votes will also adversely impact
corporate productivity. The board of directors in many large corporations
meets a few days each year for only a couple of hours.117 Because of
time constraints, conflict of interest approval votes must fight for space
on an agenda that is already crowded with such items as business policy
decisions, dividend declarations, and corporate records that must be
audited." 8 The increased need for director approval votes under
subehapter F will, therefore, result in a flood of unnecessary approval
resolutions swamping board meetings. The sheer number of these
resolutions will divert directors' attention away from both important
business decisions and actual conflicts of interest.
2.

Are DisinterestedDirectorsReally Disinterested?

Although the statute's overemphasis on disinterested director approval
is cause for concern, the reliance on disinterested director approval
without substantive fairness safeguards raises even greater doubts about
the statute's ability to protect adequately the interests of shareholders.
Social research on group dynamics has raised the issue of a structural
bias concerning whether disinterested directors are in fact truly
disinterested, and demonstrates the need for substantive safeguards in the
conflict of interest field.
Structural bias is the institutional symbiosis that exists when directors
pass judgment upon their fellow directors." 9 Although the recent debate
concerning this structural bias has focused on its effects in the context of
special litigation committees, 2 ' the problem exists irrespective of
116. See Charles W. Murdock, Corporate Governance-The Role of Special Litigation
Committees, 68 Wash. L. Rev. 79, 102 (1993) (judicial oversight necessary as breach of trust is not a
risk for which shareholders bargain); cf Ralph K. Winter Jr., State Law, ShareholderProtection,and
the Theory of the Corporation,6 J. Legal Stud. 251, 278-80 (1977) (market forces do not protect
shareholders from one shot raids by management on assets).
117. Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director'sDuty of Attention: Time
for Reality, 39 Bus. Law. 1477, 1481 (1984).
118. Robert NV. Hamilton, Reliance and Liability Standardsfor Outside Directors, 24 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 5, 12-15 (1989).
119. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981); see also James D. Cox &
Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: PsychologicalFoundationsand Legal Implicationsof
CorporateCohesion,Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1985, at 83, 85.
120. See Murdock, supra note 116, at 102-20 (structural bias is a function of group dynamics);
contra, Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board in DerivativeLitigation:
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whether the issue is duty of care or duty of loyalty.'
Indeed, the
presence of structural bias in director conflicts of interest appears to have
been recognized by the courts at common law.'
The corporate bar,
however, views the idea of a structural bias as "a relatively silly, but
harmless academic argument."' '
It characterizes the argument as
requiring one to accept the belief that directors are more willing to risk
their reputations and future zincome
than the social embarrassment of
4
challenging their colleagues.
This position, however, misconstrues the nature of structural bias as a
conscious decision-making process, rather than as an unconscious
element of individual decision-making. Social research has concluded
that people arbitrarily segregate themselves into groups and develop
loyalties toward other group members."a Feelings of group loyalty are
even stronger when the group is relatively homogenous in belief and
membership within the group is desirable. 26 These factors are present
within the context of corporate boards, as most are composed of a very
homogenous group of directors 27 who owe their positions on the board

Delaware Law and the Current ALl Proposals Compared, 44 Bus. Law. 503, 534-38 (1989)
(structural bias is unconvincing and mischievous on policy grounds).
121. Murdock, supra note 116, at 102. The duty of care concerns the lack of diligence and skill in
managing a corporation. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2 858 (Del. 1985) (directors
approved the sale of a company in a two hour meeting without viewing documents or reports). The
duty of loyalty focuses on personal opportunistic conduct such as conflicts of interest. See, e.g.,
Talbot v. James, 190 S.E.2d 759 (S.C. 1972) (corporate majority shareholder/officer hired self as a
building contractor for corporate real estate project).
Some commentators have found a lack of distinction between the two duties. See Daniel R.
Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of LiabilityRules and the DerivaiveSuit in CorporateLaw: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 261, 290-91 (1986) (distinction between
duty of care and loyalty not clear). Others have emphasized the differences between the two duties.
See Branson, supranote 21, at 382-85.
122. Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Parish, 42 Md. 598 (1875). Th ,.
court stated, "the remaining
directors are placed in the embarrassing and invidious position of having to pass upon, scrutinize and
check the transactions and accounts of one of their own body, with whom they are associated on
terms of equality in the general management of all the affairs of the corporation." Id. at 606.
123. Dooley & Veasey, supra note 120, at 535-36.
124. Id. at 535.
125. RolfHoltz & Norman Miller, Assumed Similarityand Opinion Certainty, 48 J.Personality &
Soc. Psychol. 890, 890 (1985).
126. Id.
127. More than 90 percent of all directors are white males, Heidric & Struggles, The Changing
Board 12, 3 (1988), aged at least 50, id. at 12, and have graduated c3llege, Heidrick & Struggles,
DirectorData8 (1982).
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to friendships and recommendations. 28 Service on these boards is a
great honor, with the desire for membership being overwhelmingly
29
motivated by the resulting status, rather than by the monetary rewards.'
The feelings of group loyalty that develop from the privilege of board
membership have an influence on the directors' decision-making
processes. Greater weight is accorded to fellow directors' perceptions
and explanations than to the opinions of outsiders challenging
transactions. t3 ° This structural bias within the board membership
demonstrates the need for substantive fairness safeguards in conflict of
interest statutes and the inadequate protection provided by subchapter F's
sole reliance on procedural fairness.
3.

State Substantive FairnessProtectionsand the Inadequate
Protectionof the Business JudgmentRule

The drafters attempt to offer protection against director bias by stating
that the director actions must comply with the duty of care provisions of
section 8.30 in order for the board approval to receive protective
effect.' 3 ' Any protection provided by the duty of care, however, is
"'
This rule prevents
severely restricted by the business judgment rule. 32
courts from examining the merits of business decisions in situations in
which conflicts of interest are not present.'33 The rule is, therefore,
applicable to decisions by disinterested directors who, by definition, do

128. Executive Pay: Salary Scales: View From the Top: Three Formeror Current CEOs Ponder
Pay at the Highest Levels, Wall St. J., Apr. 18, 1990, at Rl.
129. Heidrick & Struggles, The ChangingBoard 10 (1983).
130. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 119, at 103-04; Victor Bradley, The Independent DirectorHeavenly City or Potemlin Village?, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 597, 611 (1982) (unless a director is
appointed solely to monitor other members, the director's effectiveness is tempered by the need to
interact with board members on other matters).
131. Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 8.30 (Supp. 1993). The duty of care requires that directors
discharge their duties in good faith, with the care of an ordinarily prudent person and in a manner the
director believes to be in the best interests of the corporation. Id. For a listing of state duty of care
statutes, see id. comment at 934-36.
132. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (finding that there is a presumption in
making business decisions that the directors acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company). The MBCA does not
codify the business judgment rule and instead leaves its development to the courts. Model Business
Corp. Act Ann. § 8.30, commentary at 928 (Supp. 1993). For a court to examine the substance of a
decision, the plaintiffimust prove that an element is lacking and, therefore, the rule is not applicable.
133. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (stating that the business judgment rule is applicable when a
conflict of interest does not exist).
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not possess a conflict of interest. 3 4 A major precondition for invoking
the business judgment rule is that the directors must have acted on an
informed basis. 3 ' If the required disclosure has been provided to these
directors under subchapter F, 3 6 a plaintiff will have a difficult burden in
overcoming the business judgment rule and challenging any director
impropriety or collusion.
The complete reliance on procedural considerations in subchapter F
contrasts sharply with the various substantive fairness standards found in
other conflict of interest statutes. A majority of states have adopted the
original MBCA section 41 provisions' that did not contain the rigid
court review preclusions of subchapter F."38
Courts were thereby
permitted to more closely examine conflict of interest transactions for
substantive fairness.'39 States with other statutes counteract the effects of
structural bias by having director approval merely shift the burden of
proof on transaction fairness to the plaintiff in conflict of interest
litigation, 40 or by expressly requiring some form of fairness.14' Even the
American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance, which
has been criticized by commentators for weakening the director's duty of

loyalty,'42 contains a substantive fairness safeguard for director
approval.143 Subchapter F, however, has gone too far in eliminating these

134. See Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987) (noting that the business
judgment rule applies to disinterested director and shareholder approvals).
135. See supranote 132; cf Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (directors approved
sale of company in a two hour meeting without viewing documents or reports).
136. Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 8.60(4).
137. See ALI, supra note 11, at 312-13.
138. See supranotes 72-77.
139. The purpose of section 41 was not to validate a transaction between an interested director
and a corporation for all purposes, but rather to establish that a transacti:n was not void or voidable
solely by reasons of the director's interest. Model Business Corp. Act .an. § 41 comment at 844
(2d ed. 1971). For example, the court stated that the Iowa version of section 41 did not modify the
common law requirement that a corporation-controlling director has the burden of establishing good
faith, honesty, and fairness, when challenged on a conflict of interest transaction. Holi-Rest, Inc. v.
Treloar, 217 N.W.2d 517, 525 (Iowa 1974) (interpreting Iowa Code § 496A.34 (1973)).
140. See Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 5 para. 8.60 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
141. See Cal. Corp. Code § 310 (West 1990) (requiring the transaction to be just and reasonable).
142. See Joel Seligman, A Sheep in Wolfs Clothing: The American Law Institute Principles of
CorporateGovernanceProject,55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 325,369-70 (1937).
143. See ALI, supra note 11, § 5.02(a)(2)(B) (requiring that the director could have reasonably
concluded that transaction was fair to corporation).
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substantive safeguards,' 44 and states considering the revision of their
conflict of interest statutes should seriously consider alternative choices.
B.

Statutory Objectives Achieved at the Expense of Small
Corporations

The second major flaw in subchapter F is its unsuitability for most
The drafters have created a statute that provides
corporations.
predictability in the conflict of interest field for their large corporate
clients. The provisions, however, are ill-suited for the vastly more
numerous small and closely held corporations in which conflicts of
interest more frequently arise. 4 ' By catering to the needs of large
corporations, the statute will force these more typical corporations to
defend transactions in court more frequently. Serious consideration
should, therefore, be given to a conflict of interest statute that
differentiates the approval requirements for smaller and larger
corporations.
The ABA committee that drafted subchapter F is dominated
numerically by attorneys with large corporate clients.'1 6 Subchapter F's
emphasis on disinterested director approval is well-suited for the needs
of their clients. Outside directors comprise the majority of most large
corporate boards, and these individuals typically have little to do with the
As such, sufficient disinterested
corporation's daily business.147
directors' votes may easily be obtained for approval votes under
subehapter F. The statutory bright lines also allow corporations with
astute counsel to structure transactions so as to avoid the provisions or
ensure proper safe harbor approval has occurred.
Corporate statutes, however, should be responsive to the needs of
most corporations, not just the elite giants. The overwhelming majority
of corporations are not Fortune 500 companies, nor publicly held

144. See Alan R. Palmiter, Reshaping the CorporateFiduciary Model: A Director's Duty of
Independence, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 1351, 1411 (1989).
145. Robert W. Hamilton, Reflections ofa Reporter, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1455, 1466 (1985).
146. Id. at 1459. Of the 24 members of the Business Law Section in 1988, 18 were either
attorneys from large firms that represent large corporations or officers of large corporations. 44 Bus.
Law. i, x-xi (1988). This same committee also drafted the 1989 amendments to the model derivative
proceeding provisions that made derivative actions harder for shareholders to bring and easier for
management to dismiss. Model Business Corp. Act Ann. §§ 7.40-7.47 (Supp. 1992).
147. Robert NV.Hamilton, Reliance and Liability Standardsfor Outside Directors,24 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 5, 6-9 (1989).
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companies, but rather are small, closely held companies. 48 Because the
requirement for a board of directors is often either ignored or observed
only as a mere formality in many of these corporations, 149 or alternatively
is composed of family members, ° disinterested director approval
provisions are ill-suited for most typical corporations.'
Subchapter F not only ignores the circumstances of small
corporations, but its emphasis on bright lines and precise approval
provisions will create court challenges for small corporations, rather than
eliminate them. Consider two examples of situations confronting typical
small corporations. First, the sole owner/director of a corporation
transfers property to the business in exchange for debt. The corporation
later goes bankrupt. A trustee in the subsequent bankruptcy proceedings
can now allege a conflict of interest and seek to set aside the transfer
because it did not receive, nor was it capable of receiving, safe harbor
protection. The owner/director now has the difficult burden of proving
the transaction's fairness where few objective guidelines exist in the
closely held corporation setting.'52
In the second example, another typical closely held corporation that
has two shareholders, seventy percent and thirty percent respectively,
and a board composed of the two shareholders as well as the majority
shareholder's spouse, attempts to engage in a similar transfer. Under
subchapter F, the transaction is dependent on the approval of the
minority shareholder, who possesses tremendous leverage. If the
majority shareholder does not agree to the demands of the minority
shareholder, and instead approves the transfer by either a board or
shareholder vote, the minority owner can challenge the transaction as a
conflict of interest. The majority shareholder will be faced with the

148. It has been estimated that 95 percent of all corporations have fewer than ten shareholders.
Alfred F. Conard, The CorporateCensus: A PreliminaryExploration, 63 Calif. L. Rev. 440,458-59
(1975).
149. Robert E. Ginsberg, The Need for Special Close CorporationLegislation in Illinois, 25
DePaul L. Rev. 1, 23 (1975). One commentator has stated that a board of directors in a close
corporation is about as appropriate as Robert's Rules of Order for a two person get-together. E.R.
Latty, The Close Corporationand the New North CarolinaBusiness CorporationAct, 34 N.C. L.
Rev. 432, 433 (1956). Closely held corporations are those corporations that contain a small number
of stockholders, no ready market for the corporate stock, and substantial majority stockholder
participation in the management, direction, and operations of the corporation. See Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (1975).
150. F. Hodge O'Neil & Robert B. Thompson, O'Neil's Close Corporations14 (3d ed. 1992).
151. Moody, supra note 8, at 119 (conflict of interest provisions that focus on disinterested
director approval do not serve closely held corporations well).
152. Id.
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difficult burden of proving the transaction's fairness."' The bright lines
of subchapter F cause these and other situations typically encountered in
small corporations to be subjected to burdensome court litigation. The
only predictable result for states that adopt subchapter F appears to be a
rise in court cases involving small corporations forced to prove the
fairness of prior transactions.
V.

CONCLUSION

Subchapter F requires a few modifications in order to function as
intended by the drafters. It is designed to reduce the incidence of
conflicts of interest and to increase corporate efficiency. In the rush to
accomplish these goals, the drafters, however, have neglected the needs
of most typical corporations by focusing on the elite giants of the
corporate world. Furthermore, the interests of shareholders in ensuring
transaction fairness are sacrificed in the name of reduced litigation and
greater efficiency. The harmful effects that will result for the majority of
corporations under subchapter F greatly outweigh the benefits accruing
to the few. States should, therefore, seriously consider alternative conflict
of interest provisions.

153. Id.

